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HIGH ART, FoLK ART, AND OTHER SocIAL DISTINCTIONS:
CANONS, GENEALOGY AND THE CONSTRUCTION
OF AESTHETICS

Gary Shapiro

Most discussions of the arts by critics
and philosophers could be characterized
in terms of a rather studied neglect of
folk and popular art. This neglect is
hardly absolute, however, for it is important in order to articulate a specific
conception of aesthetic taste, beauty, or
style to contrast the standard being used
or praised with some other, less desirable, even degraded way of producing or
appreciating something similar. It is perhaps more than a historical coincidence
that the formation of the modern concept
of taste and aesthetic judgment, in the
eighteenth century, coincides roughly
with the discovery and valorization of
folk poetry and folk culture by the early
romantics. In fact the historical connections are often quite close. Immanuel
Kant is generally credited with having
articulated the most comprehensive and
influential statement of the modern conception of taste and aesthetic judgment,
in the Critique of judgment of 1790. There
Kant argues that to judge something to
be beautiful is to pronounce simply upon
its formal values; in particular a genuine
judgment of taste is to be distinguished
from any reponse to that which gratifies
our appetites or interests. At the same
time that Kant was developing this significant statement of the aesthetic point
of view, his former student J. G. Herder
was celebrating the culture of the Volk
and publishing their ballads and stories.
Now it might be claimed that there is no
inconsistency between these perspec-

tives; it could be said either that productions of folk-art may meet the same
aesthetic standards of disinterested
pleasure which obtain for taste generally,
or one might admit that folk art did not
as a rule meet such standards but that it
ought to be valued in some different way,
for example, as the expression of a
culture or way of life rather than as an
object of aesthetic appreciation. Yet this
is a route not usually taken; friends of
folk art and of higher art seem to be at
one in recognizing that they involve
quite different standards of excellence.
Still, one might ask whether these differences might simply co-exist in a peaceful
fashion; perhaps they are so different
that comparisons are irrelevant or misleading. Nevertheless, the history of discourse about the arts is marked by either
explicit or implicit polemics against one
or the other of these forms. For the
differences in question are, of course, not
simply natural differences but social distinctions. It is precisely by affirming
one's taste in art (or one's general cultural taste) that one affirms one's own
value; the differences spoken of here are
distinctions, in the sense in which good
taste is said to be a sign of a distinguished person, a man or woman of
distinction. The object of this exploratory study is to observe some of these
differences and their associated forms of
distinction at work in the discourse of
aesthetics and criticism. The treatment
will be partial and episodic; that is, I will
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be examining only a few thinkers drawn
from an even smaller number of national
traditions. The limitation is a consequence of both the limits of my own
reading and of the fact that while there is
much said about high art, folk art, or
popular art, comparatively little has
been written about the way in which the
formation of an audience or standard for
one form involves the making of distinctions between itself and others.
Andre Malraux, whose The Voices of
Silence is perhaps the most exhilarating
and richest account of the new world of
twentieth century art and the metamorphoses that it has produced in our
understanding of the art of the past, felt
it necessary to begin one of his essays by
claiming that folk art no longer exists. In
''Art, Popular Art, and the Illusion of
the Folk,'' he pronounces this exclusion:
Folk art no longer exists because the
"folk" no longer exists. The modern
masses, bound even in rural places to urban
civilization, are as different from the craftsmen and the peasants of the great monarchies as from the people of the Middle Ages.
The word ''people,'' when Cardinal de Retz
applied it to the Parisians, already sounded
false; if the Cardinal had not limited himself
to Paris, he would have said bourgeoisie or
populace. The people that bought religious
images and sang popular songs was born of
the oldest civilizations of the earth, would
have been partly at home in them, and could
scarcely read (Malroux 1967:29).

It might seem that even if folk art no
longer exists, it could still be a legitimate
object of both academic study and artistic appreciation. Why can't we respond
to English folk ballads even if there is no
longer a living tradition that is continuous with their earliest appearance? Here
Malraux woul9 say that the question of
such survival and tradition is all important; for he sees our attitude to art as
necessarily constituted by the prevailing
institutions, attitudes and practices of
the twentieth century art-world. On his
account this art-world is an ''imaginary

museum" in which all art of the past has
been stripped of its earlier social, religious and cultural contexts in order to
become objects that should be appreciated for their formal interest and for
their exhibition of the nobility of the
creative human spirit as it triumphs over
death by the artistic ''annexation'' of
reality. If our understanding of art is
structured and limited by the art-world
that we live in, and if the "imaginary
museum" is indeed the basic form of
that art-world then the death of folk art
would bring with it the end of the possibility of assuming an attitude toward
even the folk art of the past that could be
like that of past folk cultures. If there is
no living folk art, so the argument goes,
there cannot be any appreciation or understanding of folk art except through
the transformative perspective of the
''imaginary museum.''
This argument is far from being
completely opposed to the views of the
romantic celebrants of folk art. They too
tended to suppose that a genuine contact
with folk art was available to them only
in so far as there was a living tradition
that could transmit that art to the present day. It was important, they thought,
that their inquiries were not merely antiquarian but part of a continuous, if
historically changing, culture. Certainly
the Grimms believed something like this
in their attempt to mediate, through
their researches, between an Ursage or
primal saying sedimented in folk tradition and a contemporary middle class
public. Malraux simply denies that the
mediating elements are there and so
draws the appropriate consequences. As
far as the folk art of the past is concerned, some of it, like other past art,
can be incorporated into the ''imaginary
museum,'' and appreciated for its stylistic and formal values. But there is also
something that could be thought of as a
replacement or substitute for folk art,

